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Chris Phillips1 
University of Leeds 
Henry Wilson and the role of civil-military cooperation during the planning of 
British mobilisation for war, 1910-1914 
 
In August 1910, Henry Wilson became head of the Directorate of Military Operations [DMO] at 
the War Office. This small and isolated directorate was responsible for planning the mobilisation 
scheme to be employed by the British Expeditionary Force [BEF] in the event of war, making 
Wilson the man most connected to the ‘With France’ plan that propelled the BEF onto what 
became the Western Front.2 Over the previous six years, following the signing of the Entente 
Cordiale between France and Britain, successive Directors had developed mobilisation schemes 
within the narrow confines of the military; however the creation of such proposals could not 
remain a solely military concern if a practicable plan was to be produced. The evolution of 
modern, machine-intensive, industrial warfare brought with it the establishment of an army 
requiring quantities of men, munitions and equipment incomparable to previous British military 
experience, all of which required transportation across both land and sea. Although the term 
‘grand strategy’ would not be coined until after the First World War, the work of the DMO in 
the period under review illustrates that the twin necessities of peacetime preparation for war and 
an increasing role for ‘civilian’ actors within the military machine were, but only in part, 
recognised and acted upon prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.3 
                                                   
1 Chris Phillips' (C.Phillips@leeds.ac.uk) academic interests focus upon the era surrounding the First World War, 
with particular emphasis on railways and the logistical implications of industrialised warfare. He holds a BA (Hons) 
in Economic and Social History and an MA (Distinction) in British First World War Studies, both awarded by the 
University of Birmingham. His PhD thesis is entitled 'Managing Armageddon: the science of transportation and the 
British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918'. 
2 Although ‘W.F.’ occasionally refers to the initials of Henry Wilson and Ferdinand Foch, principal architects of the 
scheme, the term originally stood for ‘With France’. See London, The National Archives [TNA]: Public Record 
Office [PRO] WO 106/49A/1 Wilson-Foch scheme – Expeditionary Force to France, Address by Major-General 
Sir P.P. de B. Radcliffe, p. 3. 
3 H. Strachan, ‘Strategy and War’, in The Oxford Handbook of War, ed. by J. Lindley-French & Y. Boyer (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 30-42 (p. 35); The contrast is provided by the experience of munitions supply, in 
which the War Office contracts pool remained small and exclusive prior to the war despite the existence of a ‘shells 
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Using the extant records of the DMO, this article illustrates that the four years of Wilson’s 
leadership of the directorate represent a period in which the British Army, consistent with the 
dominant military ideology of the time which stressed the importance of swift, decisive battle,4 
took advantage of the technical expertise within British transport companies to ensure that the 
BEF could take to the field as quickly and efficiently as possible upon the outbreak of war in 
Europe. In contrast to the wider lack of preparation for war in Britain, leading to the ‘nearly 
calamitous breakdown’ in industrial mobilisation during the opening year of the war, the 
transport of the BEF to the seaports of Britain in the weeks following the outbreak of war was 
declared to be ‘a model of railway organisation’.5 The success of these logistical preparations was 
due to the existence of a sophisticated civil-military network fostered by Wilson during his 
period in office, whilst their character – and by implication the BEF’s immediate response to the 
outbreak of war – were governed by a combination of the complexities of mobilising an 
industrial armed force, and the strategic preferences of the Director himself.6 
 
A committed Francophile with a lifelong affinity to France engendered by a succession of 
French governesses in his youth, Wilson entered the DMO following a four-year spell as the 
Commandant of the Staff College in Camberley.7 At the Staff College, Wilson had sought to 
establish a coherent system of higher education and training for the army, of vital importance for 
                                                                                                                                                              
scandal’ during the Boer War. See C. Trebilcock, ‘War and the failure of industrial mobilisation: 1899 and 1914’, in 
War and Economic Development. Essays in memory of David Joslin, ed. by J.M. Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975), pp.139-64. 
4 S. van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, International Security, 9, no.1 
(1984), 58-107; B. Durieux, ‘The History of Grand Strategy and the Conduct of Micro-Wars’, in The Oxford 
Handbook, pp. 135-47 (pp. 143-4). 
5 Trebilcock, ‘War and the failure’, p. 139; K. Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. A Political Soldier (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 102. 
6 The ‘W.F.’ scheme was by no means universally accepted within the army during the pre-war period, however 
Wilson’s position as Director of Military Operations afforded him the opportunity to establish primacy for his own 
scheme over those who introduced alternative options by ensuring the ‘W.F.’ scheme was comprehensively planned, 
whilst the alternatives were not. See W.J. Philpott, ‘The Strategic Ideas of Sir John French’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 
12, no.4 (1989), 458-78; H. Strachan, ‘The British Army, its General Staff and the Continental Commitment 1904-
1914’, in The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation c. 1890-1939, ed. by D. French and B. Holden Reid (London: 
Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 75-94. 
7 Jeffery, Sir Henry Wilson, p. 4. 
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the development of professional skills among officers. His objective had been to create ‘a corps 
of officers imbued with uniform methods of work and a common approach to staff problems’. 
As Commandant, Wilson also took the opportunity to promote specific guiding principles to his 
students, challenging the ‘next generation’ of army officers to consider the policies he favoured 
to the detriment of alternatives. Foremost amongst the principles promoted by Wilson was the 
need for ‘readiness against Germany in alliance with France’.8 
 
Wilson’s pro-French position was demonstrated in an exercise set for the senior students at the 
College in November 1908. The group assignment, entitled the ‘Belgian Scheme’, comprised ‘a 
study of operations involving the employment of the BEF on the continent of Europe’. The 
students were handed the scenario of deteriorating relations between France and Germany, 
leading to an invasion of France through the violation of Belgian neutrality.9 The students’ task 
was to produce a memorandum illustrating the views of the General Staff as to ‘the most 
effective means of employing the BEF’ in the event of such an occurrence.10 The specificity of 
the exercise was criticised in Parliament, leading to the 1909 edition of the assignment removing 
the reference to Belgian neutrality, but maintaining the basic premise of a projected Franco-
German conflict.11 
 
Aside from inculcating his students with thoughts of a possible European war, Wilson also 
frequently visited the Franco-German-Belgian borderland, territory that would conceivably be 
                                                   
8 W. Philpott, ‘The General Staff and the Paradoxes of Continental War’, in The British General Staff, pp. 95-111 (p. 
100); it is also important to note that Wilson was by no means alone in stressing the importance of fostering friendly 
relations with France in opposition to the German threat. A former head of the DMO, James Grierson, had reached 
the same conclusion as early as 1897. See A. Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 
p. 152; Strachan, ‘British Army’, pp. 82-3. 
9 Grierson had used the same scenario as the premise behind a war game played out in 1905, which concluded that a 
British mobilisation scheme focused upon Antwerp would ‘leave the German army in a favourable position for 
pursuing its movement westwards’. See TNA: PRO WO 33/364 Records of a Strategic War Game 1905, p. 156. 
10 Jeffery, Sir Henry Wilson, p. 73. 
11 Jeffery, Sir Henry Wilson, pp. 72-3. 
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the theatre of operations for the BEF in the event of a conflict erupting.12 In the summer of 
1909 he travelled by train and bicycle from Mons into France, and along the French frontier to 
the Swiss border. The following summer he made a note of significant new German railway 
construction, out of all proportion to peace-time traffic, near the border with Luxembourg.13 As 
Stevenson has argued, through the building of ‘more lines, and by double- and quadruple-
tracking existing ones’, the European powers attempted to use railways to ‘tilt the balance’ in 
their favour should war be declared.14 Therefore, the construction Wilson noted was a sure sign 
of ongoing German military preparations and an integral part of the preparatory phase for the 
initial ‘race to the offensive’ on Germany’s western frontier.15 
 
By the time he arrived at the DMO therefore, Wilson was already highly familiar with the 
problems to be faced in the readying of the BEF for continental warfare. He also had a sound 
knowledge, based on German railway building, of where the conflict was likely to take place.16 
The technical plans he inherited to transport the BEF to that location, however, were by no 
means complete: 
 
When [Wilson] took over the appointment there were certain tentative schemes in the 
War Office pigeon holes, but these were entirely academic, not a single practical step had 
                                                   
12 Major-General C.E. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. His Life and Diaries, vol. 1 (London: Cassell, 1927), pp. 
72-3. 
13 Jeffery, Sir Henry Wilson, pp. 74-5; for a description of the major railway construction projects undertaken by 
Germany prior to the First World War, see E.F. Carter, Railways in Wartime (London: Frederick Muller, 1964), pp. 
77-8. 
14 D. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 15; 
Christian Wolmar also notes that the strategic implications of the proposed Berlin-Baghdad railway added to Anglo-
German animosities during this period. See C. Wolmar, Engines of War. How Wars Were Won and Lost on the Railways 
(London: Atlantic, 2010), pp. 127-9. 
15 The impact of rapid mobilisation upon the ability of an army to take the offensive, deemed critical to the 
successful conclusion of military operations, was a constant theme in pre-war doctrine throughout Europe. See van 
Evera, ‘Cult of the Offensive’, pp. 58-63. 
16 This information was also known by the French military authorities however, due to ‘disagreements among the 
generals, they only partially acted on it’. See Wolmar, Engines of War, p. 137. 
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been taken to give effect to them, no such thing as a railway timetable on our side of the 
Channel had been even attempted.17 
 
Over the course of the next four years, Wilson would seek to rectify this situation and ensure 
that the BEF would be ready to take part in the Franco-German war he was convinced would 
soon occur. 
 
Conceiving his primary duty upon entering the DMO to be ‘accelerating the mobilisation of the 
BEF’ to ensure its presence during the critical opening encounters of the war, Wilson 
immediately had an immense map of the Franco-German-Belgian borderland hung upon the 
wall of his office.18 The map was a graphic demonstration of Wilson’s commitment to the 
pursuit of a ‘with France’ strategy and it ‘delighted’ the French military attaché upon a visit to the 
directorate in November 1910.19 However, at the start of 1911, Wilson’s personal commitment 
to the French was not supported by a workable programme. A major obstacle was the level of 
secrecy attached to the mobilisation scheme and the problems this caused both within the army, 
in terms of interdepartmental cooperation, and in relation to obtaining the assistance of non-
military specialists. For example, the Quartermaster General’s [QMG] department, responsible 
for the movement by rail of the BEF, had not made detailed arrangements for the transport of 
troops to the ports, whilst the government had forbidden all contact with the railway companies 
over whose lines the movements would by necessity have to take place.20 
 
Though understandable on grounds of diplomacy and national secrecy, the decision to detach 
the railway companies from the planning process severely restricted the amount of work the 
DMO could achieve in relation to the mobilisation scheme, explaining the condition of the plans 
                                                   
17 WO 106/49A/1 Address by Radcliffe, p. 1. 
18 Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, vol. 1, p. 92. 
19 Jeffery, Sir Henry Wilson, p. 87. 
20 Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, vol. 1, pp. 91-2. 
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upon Wilson’s appointment. However, during this period the senior executives of railway 
companies and the officer class of the army were major institutions in British society.21 
Numerous politicians, including the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, and other prominent 
public figures (many with military backgrounds) acted as directors of the largest railway 
companies and mixed with senior military figures in social circles.22 Friendly relations were not 
uncommon between the two groups; however these social relationships were prevented from 
developing into a working partnership in the realm of mobilisation planning until 20 January 
1911.23 On this date Wilson successfully lobbied the Secretary of State for War, Richard Haldane, 
to have this restrictive decree overturned.24 
 
Despite the critical importance of the efficient use of railways in swiftly mobilising the BEF in 
the event of war, the army did not possess officers with the technical expertise required to ensure 
that the railways would be operated in the most effective manner upon the outbreak of war.25 
This lack of specialist knowledge within the military led to a perception within the railway 
industry that the army underestimated the capacity of the railways to handle the exceptional 
                                                   
21 This point is borne out by the rising salaries of railway managers in the pre-war period and the increasing numbers 
being offered knighthoods, particularly from the late nineteenth century onwards. See T.R. Gourvish, ‘A British 
Business Elite: The Chief Executive Managers of the Railway Industry, 1850-1922’, The Business History Review, 47, 
no.3 (1973), 289-316 (pp. 308-9). 
22 Grey served as a director on the North-Eastern Railway during his time out of government at the turn of the 
century. See E. Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, vol. 1 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925), pp. 58-9; for a full 
list of North-Eastern directors between 1854 and 1914, illustrating the permeability of political, military and 
industrial elites during the pre-war period, see W.W. Tomlinson, The North-Eastern Railway: Its Rise and Development 
(Newcastle-upon-Tyne: A. Reid, 1915), pp. 768-70. 
23 As an example of this Colonel Seely, upon his appointment as Secretary of State for War in succession to Haldane 
in 1912, received a number of letters of congratulation. Among the letters retained by Seely is one from William 
Paget of the London and South-Western Railway. See Oxford, Nuffield College Library [NCL]: Papers of John 
Edward Bernard Seely, Lord Mottistone. MSS Mottistone 2: Correspondence 1911-1914, 2/101-116 Letters of 
congratulation on being made Secretary of State for War, Paget to Seely, 13 June 1912. 
24 Jeffery, Sir Henry Wilson, pp. 91-2. It is important to note however that this did not mean that the ‘W.F.’ scheme 
became common knowledge within civil or military circles at this point. The majority of Parliament only became 
aware of the existence of the scheme when Grey addressed the Commons on 3 August 1914, whilst senior military 
figures such as Douglas Haig, who was to command the BEF’s I Corps, had scant knowledge of the planning 
process prior to August 1914. See S.B. Fay, The Origins of the First World War, 2nd edn, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 
1959), p. 542; G.D. Sheffield, The Chief. Douglas Haig and the British Army (London: Aurum, 2011), p. 68. 
25 The dangers of uncoordinated military command of the railways had been demonstrated during the Franco-
Prussian War in 1870, where disastrous French Army control of the rail network led to congestion, confusion and 
ultimately defeat. See A. Mitchell, The Great Train Race: Railways and the Franco-German Rivalry (New York: Berghahn, 
2000). 
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burden expected to be placed upon them at the outbreak of war.26 Such fears were not alleviated 
by the production of reports by the Committee of Imperial Defence expressing doubts about the 
‘ability of the railway companies to cope with the extra strain that would be thrown upon them 
in time of war’.27 Such judgments were made in spite of the fact that the railway companies and 
the military enjoyed a close working relationship during peacetime, particularly in the 
arrangement of movements of large bodies of troops to the annual manoeuvres. Such exercises 
were often handled under ‘war conditions’, in which orders were not communicated until the last 
minute to simulate the stresses to be expected at the opening of an actual conflict.28 Clearly, then, 
communication between the two groups was absolutely necessary in order for the railway 
companies to ensure that suitable trains (in terms of both quantity and equipment) could be 
made available to the army as soon as they were required. 
 
With permission to conduct conversations with the railway companies secured, Wilson set about 
the task of producing timetables for the despatch of the BEF, and their required equipment, to 
the ports earmarked for the embarkation of the force. The preparation of timetables was handled 
through a system of consultation between either the QMG’s department or the individual home 
commands and a selected railway company, depending on the nature of the required 
movement.29 The railway company would receive from the military authority a programme 
containing the details of each and every unit to be moved, such details including: what the unit 
would consist of in terms of men and equipment; from which station it would commence 
mobilisation; the day after general mobilisation on which the move was to begin; and the time at 
                                                   
26 ‘Railways and Military Operations’, Railway Gazette, 7 August 1914, p. 174. 
27 NCL: MSS Mottistone 11: CID, 1909-1912, 11/1-13 Correspondence and documentation relating to the business 
of the sub-committee of the CID looking at the transportation and distribution of food and supplies, chaired by J.S., 
Sub-Committee to consider the desirability of an enquiry into the question of local transportation and distribution 
of food supplies in time of war, 28 February 1910, p. 3. 
28 As an example, the London and South-Western Railway was responsible for the movement of ‘26,000 officers and 
men, 8,000 horses, 70 guns, and 1,200 transport vehicles, necessitating the running of 137 special trains… in the 
manoeuvre area’ during the summer manoeuvres of 1910. See ‘Railways and Military Operations’, p. 174. 
29 TNA: PRO WO 106/50 Scheme for mobilisation on a war footing – progress of scheme for despatch of forces 
(WH/1), Enclosure 1A – Memorandum by Captain H.O. Mance, R.E. (Staff Captain, QMG 2) on the questions 
raised by the Executive Committee in their Memorandum of 10 December 1912, 1 January 1913. 
Chris Phillips Ex Historia 122 
which it should arrive at the destination port. The railway company was then to arrange all the 
technical aspects of the move: the provision of rolling stock; the times of passing stations and 
junctions en route; the working up of a complete timetable; and the necessary steps to ensure 
that the locomotives and crews required would be available and run to time whenever the need 
for them arose.30 Wherever potential clashes arose, the matter would be referred to the DMO 
who would prioritise the more urgent move. 
 
As Southampton, earmarked for the despatch of the main body of troops, was on the London 
and South-Western system, the London and South-Western Railway [LSWR] became intimately 
connected with the development of the ‘W.F.’ scheme.31 Throughout the development of the 
schedule the LSWR acted as a ‘secretary railway’, the designated point of contact for all 
correspondence in reference to the scheme for both the War Office and the other railway 
companies involved.32 The projected time of arrival for each train at Southampton was delivered 
to a specialist staff working exclusively on the mobilisation timetable at the LSWR, and from this 
arrival time the route for each individual train could be planned back to the point at which it 
would be required to enter the London and South-Western system. The companies over whose 
lines the train would pass immediately before it entered the London and South-Western network 
would then be notified of the time they were expected to hand the train over. From this 
information that company could then trace the journey further back, either to the station of 
departure or to the next ‘handover’ station on the route.33 
 
                                                   
30 E.A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War; Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and Achievements, vol. 1 (London: Selwyn 
& Blount, 1921), pp. 27-8. 
31 Southampton had fulfilled the same role in 1899 at the outbreak of the Boer War, and had a history of military 
service throughout the era of the British Empire. See I. Beckett, ‘Going to War. Southampton and Military 
Embarkation’, in Southampton: Gateway to the British Empire, ed. by M. Taylor (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), pp. 133-46; 
TNA: PRO WO 106/49A/2 Outline of scheme and details relating to Staff arrangements (with notes April 1937), 
iv. Home Railway movements. 
32 WO 106/49A/1 Address by Radcliffe, p. 7. 
33 Pratt, British Railways, vol. 1, pp. 112-4. 
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Once the journey had been traced back to the station of departure, the time of entrainment was 
entered onto the individual unit’s mobilisation scheme.34 However, as the war establishments of 
certain units were amended each year by the Army Council, the timetables demanded constant 
revision to take into account the necessary changes and the possibility of specific railway 
equipment being required. Such changes could also raise the prospect of units being sent to 
different ports of embarkation, or adjustments made to the priority of their departure. Given the 
complexities involved, making these revisions was a time-consuming process, both for the DMO 
and for the larger railway companies.35 Wilson for example would note in December 1913 that, 
despite those involved in the process having nearly two years experience by this point, when 
working in conjunction with the QMG and Admiralty upon amendments handed down from the 
Army Council, it took four months for the DMO to effect changes to the timetable.36 
 
The period that followed the Wilson-Haldane conversation was not simply characterised by hard 
work at the DMO and among the railway companies. The period was one of inter-departmental 
cooperation between those government departments which existed ‘solely for the purpose of 
war’ such as the Admiralty and the War Office, and those whose primary responsibility lay in the 
administration of peacetime Britain.37 This cooperation was exemplified in the creation of the 
‘War Book’, a series of instructions to be followed by appropriate government departments and 
industrial concerns upon the declaration of a precautionary period and consequent 
announcement of an order to mobilise. First published in 1912, and amended following further 
discussions in both 1913 and 1914, the book acted as a step-by-step guide for officials in areas as 
wide-ranging as the provision of policemen for the protection of vital railway junctions to the 
                                                   
34 WO 106/49A/1 Address by Radcliffe, p. 7. 
35 The largest railway company in Britain prior to the war, the London and North-Western Railway, received such 
drastic alterations to their share of the transportation task during the winter of 1912-13 that the company created a 
special department dedicated purely to the amendment of the scheme to ensure its readiness. See E.A. Pratt, War 
Record of the London and North-Western Railway (London: Selwyn & Blount, 1922), pp. 6-7; Pratt, British Railways, vol. 1, 
p. 29 details the strain of the work on railway employees. 
36 WO 106/49A/2 Revision of programme: remarks of various directorates, 4 December 1913. 
37 TNA: PRO CAB 15/2 Minutes, Papers and War Books, Note by the Secretary, 4 November 1910. 
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despatch of mobilisation telegrams to soldiers. From the 1913 edition onwards, the ‘War Book’ 
was arranged in chapters by department, so that each group could obtain the instructions 
relevant to their department without having to concern themselves with orders only applicable to 
other sections. 
 
The Foreign Office, responsible for giving notice of the possibility of war to the other 
departments involved, appeared first in the book. Next were the War Office and Admiralty, 
whose chief concerns were the security of the nation and the mobilisation of the army and navy, 
followed by the Colonial and Indian Offices, in charge of Britain’s overseas territories. The Privy 
Council and Treasury, responsible for issuing the proclamation of war and the authorisation of 
war measures, followed, along with the Home Office and Local Government Board who were to 
oversee internal order and the relief of distress. The final chapters of the book dealt with the 
Board of Trade, through whom the railway companies received their instructions, the Customs 
and Excise Board with their duties in relation to supply and blockade, and the Post Office, 
responsible for the gargantuan task of delivering the mobilisation telegrams and disseminating 
official information.38 By crystallising the commands in print, the ‘War Book’ ensured that the 
response of the government and the required British industries – regardless of the turnover in 
personnel between the creation and implementation of the orders contained within – would be 
coherent and organised. Employees at the Board of Trade or the general managers of railway 
companies, people whose daily focus was primarily upon their peacetime occupations rather than 
war preparation, could simply consult the book in order to establish ‘best practice’ upon 
receiving the signal to mobilise.39 
 
                                                   
38 S. Sokolov Grant, ‘The Origins of the War Book’, Royal United Services Institution [RUSI]. Journal, 117:667 (1972), 
65-9, (p. 66). 
39 Copies of all three ‘War Books’ are available. See TNA: PRO CAB 15/3-5 War Book: Summary of action taken 
by Departments, 27 February 1912-30 June 1914. 
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Concurrent with production of the ‘War Book’, action continued to take place on the task of 
transporting the BEF across the sea. On the British side of the Channel, the owners of the port 
of Southampton, the LSWR, undertook significant railway construction to bring the total length 
of track within the docks up to thirty-seven miles.40 Bespoke diagram boards charting the special 
facilities required by individual units were also set up to allow the port authorities to keep track 
of the complex demands of the military.41 Elsewhere, Newhaven in Sussex, the closest Channel 
port to London, had been chosen as the primary embarkation point for the myriad supplies 
required by the BEF, whilst Avonmouth, Liverpool, Belfast, Queenstown, Cork and Glasgow 
were also assigned roles in the mobilisation process.42 
 
On the French side, upon the invitation of Colonel Seely four shipping experts investigated the 
problems to be tackled in the landing of the BEF upon the European mainland.43 Sir Thomas 
Royden and Sir Lionel Fletcher took up the challenge and, together with officers from both the 
naval and military staffs of Britain and France, made a thorough reconnaissance of the Channel 
ports to be used by the BEF. The shipping of the BEF was a highly technical operation, 
requiring detailed examination of such questions as berthing facilities, tidal limitations, the 
number and power of the cranes available and the existence of suitable storage facilities.44 The 
recommendations of the Royden-Fletcher report, handed over to the Admiralty in February 
1913, were adopted as the basis of the scheme for disembarkation in France.45 
 
                                                   
40 The LSWR had taken over the port, including the Southampton Dock Company, in 1892; Pratt, British Railways, 
vol. 2, pp. 1008-9. 
41 Beckett, ‘Going to War’, p. 142. 
42 The Modern History and Future Prospects of Newhaven Harbour, Sussex (London: Newhaven Harbour Company, 1884); 
Brigadier-General Sir J.E. Edmonds, History of the Great War based on Official Documents. Military Operations. France and 
Belgium, 1914, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1928), pp. 30-1. 
43 The four were Sir Thomas Royden (Cunard Company), Sir Lionel Fletcher (White Star), Sir Richard Holt (Blue 
Funnel) and Sir Owen Philipps (Royal Mail). Royden and Fletcher, ‘in order to fully discharge [the task]… gave up 
all their private work for many months’. See F.E.S. Birkenhead, Contemporary Personalities (London: Cassell, 1924), pp. 
291-2. 
44 The extent to which prominent figures such as Royden, Fletcher and the general managers of railway companies 
were coerced by the government into assisting the military in such investigations, or whether such time-consuming 
tasks were undertaken with great patriotic enthusiasm, is currently unclear and would benefit from further study. 
45 WO 106/49A/1 Address by Radcliffe, p. 4. 
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The Royden-Fletcher report highlighted that the crane facilities at each of the ports earmarked to 
receive the BEF: Havre, Rouen and Boulogne, were inadequate for the task of handling the 
supplies projected to accompany the force. In order to prevent backlogs occurring therefore, it 
was decided that mechanical transport should be divided and sent to all three ports rather than 
being concentrated upon one facility.46 Such recommendations inevitably led to further 
amendments to the mobilisation timetables in Britain.47 In light of the vast quantities of data 
being received, processed and acted upon by the DMO in conjunction with the scheme, regular 
service updates were demanded by Wilson to verify that the most current information was being 
acted upon, and that existing deficiencies in the scheme were in the process of being rectified.48 
 
These ‘board meetings’ also offered Wilson’s subordinates the opportunity to report on the 
progress of particular tasks to the Director, for instance on the procurement of lorries to be used 
by the BEF.49 The majority of the vehicles required were to be sourced from civilian firms upon 
mobilisation. Of these, the bulk were to be purchased through a provisional subsidy scheme 
between the army and the vehicle owner, the rest by impressments upon mobilisation. A census 
was carried out over the course of 1912 in order to identify suitable vehicles.50 By September 
1913 the DMO was able to confirm that over 600 of the 1000 vehicles required to complete the 
war establishment of the BEF had been provisionally registered, whilst the QMG’s department 
were busy overseeing the enlistment of 3,000 men to drive and maintain the vehicles.51 The 
number of petrol lorries to be obtained by the Army Service Corps had been reduced to 383 and 
arrangements for the impressments of the necessary vehicles upon mobilisation had been made, 
                                                   
46 WO 106/49A/2 Outline of scheme, i. Factors affecting plan of movement and Staff work. 
47 WO 106/49A/2. A hand-written note on the file states that the timetables for 1913 had been amended in light of 
the recommendations of the Royden-Fletcher report. 
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the lorries in question having been earmarked for military use. In all, procedures for the 
provision of mechanical transport were observed, a year before hostilities commenced, to have 
‘reached a point where it may be considered there is no room for anxiety as to provision’.52 
 
Through careful liaison with suitably qualified civilian experts and the cooperation of British 
industry, wedded to Wilson’s determination to complete the project and be able to render 
assistance to the French, details for both the movement of, and logistical support for, the BEF 
were settled by August 1914. A complete set of timetables had been printed and issued to the 
relevant units detailing their peace station, place of mobilisation and the location of their 
mobilisation equipment, alongside a series of tables distributed to each of the commands 
indicating the date after general mobilisation on which every unit had to be ready to move.53 As 
Wilson deemed the swift arrival of the BEF to be critical to the success of Anglo-French 
operations, each unit was instructed that mobilisation would take place at the designated time, 
regardless of whether the unit had completed their preparations or not.54 
 
Although Britain’s commitment to the war would be governed by Cabinet decision rather than 
by the existence of inflexible timetables, the swift arrival of that commitment was dependent 
upon the efficient implementation of the railway moves worked out over the preceding three 
years.55 Each unit or part thereof was allocated to a train, whose projected time of arrival was 
recorded alongside their departure time from the mobilisation camp. At the embarkation ports, 
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troops or supplies were allocated to a cross-Channel transport and the serial number of the ship 
telegrammed to the destination port. This was to ensure that the authorities in France were 
aware of the contents of each arriving ship and could direct it to the most suitable berth for 
disembarkation.56 Finally, following an enforced rest period at the French ports, the units would 
be arranged into trainloads on the French pattern and transported to the concentration zone.57 
The final step of this itinerary was overseen by the French military transport authorities centred 
at French Grand Quartier Général who had accepted responsibility for the ‘construction, repair, 
maintenance, traffic management and protection’ of the BEF’s logistics network for the duration 
of the conflict.58 
 
For all Wilson’s statements emphasising the importance of the BEF mobilising in line with the 
French, Britain would not enter the war, and therefore authorise a general mobilisation, until the 
expiration of the ultimatum to Germany on the night of 4 August.59 This was almost three days 
later than the French. The delay caused Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, to 
declare the ‘W.F.’ scheme null and void, suggesting instead that the force should be shipped to 
Antwerp.60 Aside from the implications of such a move to Dutch neutrality, the transportation of 
the BEF to Antwerp had already been discounted as unfeasible on strategic grounds by 
Grierson’s war game in 1905. As a result of the war game, Belgian reticence to encourage a close 
relationship with the British military, and Wilson’s obfuscation in the face of alternatives to the 
‘W.F.’ scheme, the port of Antwerp had not been thoroughly reconnoitred to assess its suitability 
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as a landing zone for British troops, nor had the requisite railway timetables from the port to the 
area of concentration been developed and distributed among the units.61 
 
The scale of the work undertaken by the DMO over the previous four years had demonstrated 
that ship and rail movements utilising foreign facilities ‘simply could not be improvised at the last 
moment’.62 For the senior commander of the BEF to suggest such a policy at this stage was 
largely reflective of French’s long-held concerns over the autonomy of his command on French 
soil, but augured ill for his appreciation of the importance of logistics during the coming 
conflict.63 Any further discussion of Antwerp as a possible destination was terminated via an 
explanation of the impracticality of amending the mobilisation scheme in such a drastic fashion 
at such a late stage by Sir Charles Douglas, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Haig’s 
proposal, for the BEF to remain at home for ‘two or three months, during which the immense 
resources of the Empire’ could be developed, was similarly discounted. The nature of the 
understanding between the British and French governments, symbolised by the exchange of 
letters in 1912, and the lack of resources in Britain for a long war, a result of military spending 
restrictions imposed by a Liberal government committed to social reform, meant that however 
small the force relative to the vast armies of France and Germany, British support was expected 
on the other side of the Channel immediately.64 
 
With the alternatives dismissed, the only remaining practicable mobilisation scheme was 
Wilson’s. It boasted the benefits of thorough logistical preparation, interdepartmental 
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cooperation, the input of technically qualified industrial experts and, crucially, it could be 
brought into action almost immediately. The following day Lord Kitchener, freshly installed as 
Secretary of State for War, decided that four divisions of the six provided for in the mobilisation 
scheme could be immediately transported to France.65 On 8 August, owing to the interruption to 
arrangements brought about by what Wilson referred to as the ‘dithering’ of the government 
over the previous week, the railway programme commenced. 350 trains, comprising an average 
of thirty vehicles each, were made up ready for despatch to Southampton.66 The schedule 
demanded that the LSWR put those 350 trains into the port within sixty hours. The level of 
contingency built into the timetables led to ‘by far the greater proportion’ of trains arriving at the 
ports between twenty and thirty minutes early, with just one train arriving late, and by only five 
minutes. The sixty hour target was achieved in just forty-five. Practically every day for the first 
three weeks of the war, the railways handled between seventy and ninety trains per day, arriving 
into the port at intervals of just under one quarter of an hour.67 
 
Britain’s status as one of the world’s foremost industrial powers, possessing an abundance of 
specialists in myriad fields of business and commerce alongside a dense logistics network, 
ensured that Britain’s mobilisation strategy was guided by professional advice and that the 
advanced transportation links throughout the country were employed to the highest standards of 
efficiency. The BEF in 1914 may have attempted a military manoeuvre more complex than 
anything previously attempted by a British force but, unlike the German Army’s ‘Schlieffen 
Plan’, it did not attempt anything that was logistically ‘a gamble’.68 The industrial scale of modern 
warfare ensured that the effective contribution of a British force required detailed planning and 
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thorough organisation, aspects which demanded a significant investment of both time and 
resources. In mobilisation at least, unlike in the supply of manpower or munitions, this occurred; 
the thorough work of the DMO and the employees of numerous railway companies – artfully 
applied by Henry Wilson towards the strategy he himself favoured – ensured that the BEF took 
its place on the French left prior to the colossal engagement at Mons that would signify the 
commencement of Britain’s contribution to the fighting on the Western Front. 
 
As a French artillery officer noted in 1913, the intervention of the BEF in a European war was a 
military act too serious to be left to the ‘eleventh hour’.69 Unlike Germany and France however, 
instinctively wedded to the rigid ‘Schlieffen Plan’ and ‘Plan XVII’ schemes respectively, Britain 
was not committed to an autonomous ‘war by timetable’ in the opening days of the conflict.70 
British strategy in the first week of August was, in fact, guided more by political considerations 
of domestic and foreign policy than by inflexible mobilisation schedules. The decision to go to 
war, and the time to act upon that decision, were reached by governmental judgment rather than 
by the demands of railway schedules.71 
 
The work of the DMO, although concealed from both Parliament and much of the army 
throughout the pre-war period, did not occur within a vacuum. The evolution of the ‘With 
France’ scheme, from the appointment of Henry Wilson as Director onwards, was influenced by 
the input and knowledge of prominent civilian business leaders and by the strategy favoured by 
Wilson himself. It was the technical expertise of a highly-skilled industrial society, guided by a 
‘forceful advocate of the continental commitment’, which ensured that the BEF was transported 
across land and sea in time – and position – to make a telling contribution to the initial battles of 
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the First World War.72 As such, it was an illustration of what could be achieved in an industrial 
conflict given sound, logistically feasible, foundations, and represents Britain’s first step towards 





The National Archives of the United Kingdom, London 
CAB 15/2-5, Committee of Imperial Defence, Committee on the Co-ordination of 
Departmental Action on the Outbreak of War, and War Cabinet, War Priorities 
Committee: Minutes, Papers and War Books 
CAB 22/1, War Council and successors: Minutes and Papers. War Council: Minutes of Meetings 
WO 33/364, War Office: Reports, Memoranda and Papers (O and A Series). Records of a 
Strategic War Game 
WO 106/47, War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence, and 
predecessors: Correspondence and Papers. Defence and Operational Plans 
WO 106/49A-B, War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence, and 
predecessors: Correspondence and Papers. Wilson-Foch Scheme – Expeditionary Force 
to France 
WO 106/50, War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence, and 
predecessors: Correspondence and Papers. Defence and Operational Plans 
WO 138/52, War Office: Personal Files. General Sir John Cowans 
 
Nuffield College Library, Oxford 
Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, Lord Mottistone: 
                                                   
72 Strachan, ‘British Army’, p. 77; Pratt, British Railways, vol. 1, p. 115. 
Chris Phillips Ex Historia 133 
MSS Mottistone 2: Correspondence 1911-1914 
MSS Mottistone 11: Committee of Imperial Defence, 1909-1912 
 
Secondary Sources 
Anon, The Modern History and Future Prospects of Newhaven Harbour, Sussex (London: Newhaven 
Harbour Company, 1884) 
——, ‘Mobilisation and Movement of Troops’, in Records of Railway Interests in the War (London: 
The Railway News, 1915), 18 
Bate, Brigadier-General T.R.F., ‘Horse Mobilisation’, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 
67:465 (1922), 16-25 
Beckett, I., ‘Going to War. Southampton and Military Embarkation’, in Southampton: Gateway to the 
British Empire, ed. by M. Taylor (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), pp. 133-46 
Birkenhead, F.E.S., Contemporary Personalities (London: Cassell, 1924) 
Brown, I.M., British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914-1919 (London: Praeger, 1998) 
Callwell, Major-General C.E., Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. His Life and Diaries, vol. 1 (London: 
Cassell, 1927) 
Carter, E.F., Railways in Wartime (London: Frederick Muller, 1964) 
de Tarlé, Capitaine d’Artillerie A., ‘The British Army and a Continental War’, Royal United Services 
Institution. Journal, 57:421 (1913), 384-401 
d’Ombrain, N., War Machinery and High Policy. Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain 1902-1914 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) 
Edmonds, Brigadier-General J.E., History of the Great War based on Official Documents. Military 
Operations. France and Belgium, 1914, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1928) 
Fay, S.B., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd edn, 2 vols (New York: Macmillan, 1959) 
French, D., and B. Holden Reid, eds, The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation c. 1890-1939 
(London: Frank Cass, 2002) 
Chris Phillips Ex Historia 134 
Gourvish, T.R., ‘A British Business Elite: The Chief Executive Managers of the Railway 
Industry, 1850-1922’, The Business History Review, 47, no.3 (1973), 289-316 
Grey, E., Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, vol. 1 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925) 
Hamilton, R.F., and H.H. Herwig, eds, War Planning 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) 
Henniker, Colonel A.M., History of the Great War. Transportation on the Western Front 1914-1918 
(London: His/Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1937) 
Jeffery, K., Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. A Political Soldier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) 
Lindley-French, J., and Y. Boyer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 
Mitchell, A., The Great Train Race: Railways and the Franco-German Rivalry, 1815-1914 (New York: 
Berghahn, 2000) 
Philpott, W.J., ‘The Strategic Ideas of Sir John French’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 12, no.4 (1989), 
458-78 
Pratt, E.A., British Railways and the Great War; Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and Achievements, vol. 1 
(London: Selwyn & Blount, 1921) 
——, War Record of the London and North-Western Railway (London: Selwyn & Blount, 1922) 
Sheffield, G.D., The Chief. Douglas Haig and the British Army (London: Aurum, 2011) 
Sokolov Grant, S., ‘The Origins of the War Book’, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 117:667 
(1972), 65-9 
Spiers, E.M., Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980) 
Stevenson, D., Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996) 
Taylor, A.J.P., War by Time-table: How the First World War Began (London: Macdonald, 1969) 
Chris Phillips Ex Historia 135 
Tomlinson, W.W., The North-Eastern Railway: Its Rise and Development (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: A. 
Reid, 1915) 
Trebilcock, C., ‘War and the failure of industrial mobilisation: 1899 and 1914’, in War and 
Economic Development. Essays in memory of David Joslin, ed. by J.M. Winter (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 139-64 
Vagts, A., The Military Attaché (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) 
Van Creveld, M., Supplying War. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977) 
Van Evera, S., ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, International 
Security, 9, no.1 (1984), 58-107 
Williamson, Jr., S.R., The Politics of Grand Strategy. Britain and France Prepare for War (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1969) 
Wolmar, C., Engines of War. How Wars Were Won and Lost on the Railways (London: Atlantic, 2010) 
 
Newspapers 
Railway Gazette, 7 August 1914 
——, 20 November 1914 
